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Differentiating Animality from Agency 
Towards a Foundation for Cognition 
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The notion of cognition has been difficult to pin down. 
Embodied and situated approaches to cognition now 
suggests that agency, construed in terms of perception-
action coupling, might provide a clear foundation for 
cognition. Yet, this attempt has problems of its own. 
First, a demarcation problem: Which systems are agents 
and why? Second, a graduality problem: Agency is a 
way of describing that is either used or not, and it is 
difficult to envision an incremental route toward 
agency. To overcome these problems, I differentiate 
between agency and a new notion, animality. Animality 
can be described as the sensorimotor organization by 
means of which animals modify environmental 
conditions. By developing this notion of animality I 
claim that it becomes possible to get a grip on the 
foundational problems of cognition and agency. 
Keywords: Cognition; agency; animality; perception-action; 
intentional stance; philosophy; biology; cognitive science. 
Introduction 
“There is actually little consensus as to what makes 
something a cognitive process. Often, the class of processes 
that we regard as cognitive is defined by ostension.” 
(Rowlands, 2003, p.157). Mark Rowlands nicely 
summarizes here both the current lack of clear ideas about 
what makes something a cognitive system, as well as the 
lack of a feeling of urgency when this is brought to the fore. 
We simply point to processes like perceiving, remembering, 
thinking, reasoning and language and take these to make up 
the cognitive domain. In addition, the standard cognitive 
science view is that almost any system can be considered 
cognitive as long as we think it is usefully described in these 
cognitive terms. Beyond that, it does not seem to matter 
very much whether they are physically computers, animals, 
or humans. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why or when 
these entities can be deemed cognitive. To illustrate the 
point, 56 years after Turing’s first try at an answer, we still 
have no clear criteria to decide whether an AI program has 
to be considered a model or an instance of a thinking 
system. The question: “What makes something a cognitive 
system?” is far from solved. 
 After a long time of neglect, the question currently gains 
a new urgency as embodied and situated cognition now uses 
the notion of cognition in different ways that require 
clarification. Also, the standard way of demarcating the 
cognitive domain is unsatisfactory, as I will argue below.  
 In this paper, I address the question posed above by 
introducing the concept of animality; the sensorimotor 
organization by means of which animals modify 
environmental conditions. The aim of introducing animality 
is to demarcate a natural domain, which is plausibly cast as 
the material foundation of cognitive systems. First, I will 
discuss why the current delineation of cognition is 
problematical; second, how embodied and situated 
cognition tries to base cognition in agency, and why this 
project is hampered by similar problems; third, in order to 
overcome these problems, I differentiate between agency 
and animality and develop the latter in a preliminary way. 
Finally, I will conclude that animality is a plausible 
candidate as a material foundation for cognition and agency. 
Problems with Ascribed Cognition 
Within cognitive science there is a strong tendency to 
ascribe cognition when we can interpret a system in terms 
like perceiving, remembering etc. Dennett (1981) 
introduced the notion of an intentional stance to describe 
this way of having intentional—mental or cognitive—
systems. Taking an intentional stance amounts to treating a 
system as a rational agent and figuring out what its beliefs 
and desires are likely to be. In this way, we can often 
understand and predict what such a system will do without 
needing to know about its detailed physical makeup. The 
intentional stance provides a way to combine our mental or 
intentional vocabulary with a mechanistic understanding of 
cognitive phenomena. One can use the mental vocabulary to 
predict and explain particular, cognitive, systems, while the 
stress on it being a stance makes it perfectly clear that this is 
merely a different description of a physical system. There is 
no risk of an unaccounted for ghost in the machine. 
Cognition thus conceived is a useful and pragmatic way 
of demarcating the cognitive domain. Nevertheless, it comes 
at great theoretical costs. Most notably, I will argue, is that 
it obstructs a clear linkage between the cognitive domain 
and particular kinds of material systems.  
A Double Bind 
Suppose that systems are to be considered cognitive or not 
on the basis of applying an intentional stance: If such a 
stance is applied successfully, then the system counts as a 
cognitive one. However, as we are free to apply the 
intentional stance to whatever we want—be it a falling 
stone, thermostat, animal or human being—and given that 
the notion of successful appliance is open to many different 
interpretations, this is a very unconstrained way of 
demarcating a cognitive domain. In particular, it amounts to 
a way of having cognition which remains independent of 
any particular material organization of the so described 
systems. Thus the view arises that, even though an AI 
program runs on a computer and not ‘on a brain,’ it still may 
be considered cognitive.  
But there is also an opposing intuition: There ought to be 
something about the systems themselves that makes them 
cognitive or not: Humans and falling stones are just too 
different. The issue also comes to the fore in research on 
animal cognition, where it is a major research effort to 
establish whether particular animals can be deemed 
cognitive or not. Thus, there is clearly more to be said about 
delineating cognitive systems than applying an intentional 
stance. According to this intuition, we are not free to 
postulate cognition wherever we want. 
The way to go from here is investigate the physical means 
that might account for the differences between genuine 
cognitive systems and systems more generally. However, an 
intentional stance deemphasizes the means by which an 
agent achieves its goals. Dennett once introduced the 
revealing phrase ‘wise wiring’ (1987), which illustrates the 
point. The phrase ‘wiring’ refers to an arbitrary set of 
connections that are in themselves neither systematic nor 
very important as long as it produces the required ‘wise’ 
result. This choice of words implies that the physical system 
involved is not special but an ordinary system, which 
merely happens to produce particular results. Thus, if one 
would stress the importance of the wiring, then this would 
count as a dismissal of the need for cognition, rather than its 
articulation. In addition, tying cognition to particular kinds 
of systems will always exclude systems that are currently 
taken to belong to the cognitive domain as derived from the 
intentional stance. Of course, most of those exclusions 
would be according to the intent of such an endeavor, but 
border disputes would nevertheless arise, which might seem 
to discredit the very project. 
These opposing tendencies lead to a double bind when it 
comes to answering the question of what cognition is. The 
intentional stance provides an intuitively plausible cognitive 
domain, but remains too unspecific to be the whole story. At 
the same time, the force of the intentional stance criterion 
makes it almost impossible to delineate cognitive systems in 
a more specific way, because it is not the ‘wiring’ that 
counts, but its being wise. 
A Conceptual Dichotomy 
In summary, an intentional stance sets up a conceptual 
dichotomy between intentional and mechanical systems, but 
does so without a corresponding dichotomy between 
different kinds of material systems, and even prohibiting 
any material distinction to be the relevant one. At the same 
time, there are good reasons to suppose that there must be 
more specific physical, organizational or dynamical aspects 
to cognitive systems that ought to set them apart as a 
particular kind of material system. Thus, taking cognition as 
something that can be simply ascribed by taking an 
intentional stance may suffice for cognitive science in the 
short run, but it also obstructs raising the question what 
cognition could be on a more fundamental material level. 
Founding Cognition in Agency? 
How to proceed? In the last fifteen years or so, embodied 
and situated interpretations of cognition have been critical 
of interpreting cognition in terms of internal reasoning 
processes. Instead, they made a strong case for putting 
cognition squarely in the context of perception-action 
relations (Brooks, 1999; Clark, 1997; Hurley, 1998; Keijzer, 
2001; Pfeifer & Scheier, 2001; Van Gelder, 1998). 
Embodied and situated cognition does not claim that all 
cognitive processes consist only of perception-action 
relations, but it does tend towards the view that even 
presumably fully internal cognitive processes as 
remembering and reasoning are ultimately based in 
perception-action systems. Without going into these details 
here, in my view, embodied and situated approaches have 
promising implications for developing more specific 
answers to the question what cognition might be. 
Firstly, embodied and situated approaches place cognition 
in the context of agents who perceive and act in an 
environment. This forms a firm step to a more concrete 
interpretation of cognition. Secondly, a perception-action 
interpretation is more congenial to a biological and 
evolutionary perspective on cognition. When primarily 
interpreted as inner thought, cognition remains almost 
specifically human and its link with biology and evolution is 
not self-evident. In contrast, perception and action are 
spread widely across the biological domain and have a clear 
evolutionary relevance. Such a link with biology is good 
because biology provides much stronger and more detailed 
constraints on cognition than what can be derived from the 
mental vocabulary (Lyon, 2006). 
Despite these positive aspects, there are important 
problems associated with grounding cognition in agency. I 
will discuss two of them. 
A: The demarcation problem: When we take agency as 
the deciding factor for considering systems cognitive or not, 
what are the criteria to distinguish agents from non-agents? 
One should get a déjà vu here: Do falling stones, computers, 
animals and software agents all provide examples of 
perception-action systems? Clearly, when the notion of 
cognition is difficult to pin down, the same problem applies 
to agents (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995). 
B: The graduality problem: How can this notion of 
agency be cast in an incremental way? Being considered an 
agent seems to be an all or nothing affair. The famous 
analytical philosopher Donald Davidson notes: “We have 
many vocabularies for describing nature when we regard it 
as mindless, and we have a mentalistic vocabulary for 
describing thought and intentional action: what we lack is a 
way of describing what is in between. This is particularly 
evident when we speak of the ‘intentions’ and ‘desires’ of 
simple animals; we have no better way to explain what they 
do” (1999, p.11). Of course, we can easily think up a 
gradient of very stupid to very smart agents, but then we do 
not have a gradient from the mindless to the mindful. Even a 
stupid agent is a full agent and we still have the problem of 
how to reach the point of such minimal agency in a gradual 
and non-arbitrary way. 
The analysis of these problems is straightforward: Agency 
is also a matter of ascription, and itself part and parcel of the 
intentional stance. Agency, then, does not provide a material 
foundation for cognition. However, it does form a signpost  
in the right direction. 
Differentiating Animality from Agency 
Agency promised to contribute two positive features to a 
possible material foundation for the notion of cognition—
perception-action relations and a biological context—but 
could not deliver the goods. To proceed, a different provider 
is necessary. The crux to progress, is to disregard the 
intentional stance criterion altogether and to turn directly to 
those physically constituted systems that definitely embody 
the combined characteristics of perception-action relations 
as well as a biological context. 
Complying with the second characteristic is relatively 
easy because one can simply refer to living organizations, 
which have a clear scientific status. One can even leave it at 
that and take life itself as designating the cognitive domain 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980; Stewart, 1996). However, it 
seems preferable to cast cognition in terms that also take the 
perception-action aspect as a precondition (Van Duijn, 
Keijzer & Franken, in press). As I have just discarded the 
intentional idiom as a backdrop for concepts like perception 
and action, it is also essential to provide a different 
foundation for these terms. 
Both desiderata can be had by turning to animals, or 
rather animalia:1 These are concrete living systems where 
the notions of perception and action readily apply. To mark 
the difference in background, I will use the phrase 
sensorimotor relations henceforward. Animalia constitute a 
set of systems that is markedly smaller than life itself, 
includes the human case, and involves systems at widely 
varying levels of sensorimotor complexity. Suppose now 
that we take animalia as the paradigmatic cognitive systems, 
then, the key question becomes: What is it about animalia 
that makes them cognitive? The answer cannot be 
formulated in terms of agency, because this is precisely the 
notion that we seek to find a foundation for. 
In the following, I propose a principled distinction 
between the notion of agency and what I call animality. 
Animality refers to the structural dynamical sensorimotor 
organization by which animalia modify environmental 
conditions through movement. These result in dynamical 
relations that embody particular fleeting dynamical 
structures which subserve the metabolic and reproductive 
requirements of the living organization to which they 
belong. 
                                                           
1
 Animalia because being free-moving creatures is what counts, 
sessile animals being a borderline case, while free-moving bacteria 
as well as protozoa should fall in. 
While the notion of agency, and cognition, can be applied 
very widely, animality is restricted to animalia, and refers to 
the specific organizational setup responsible for generating 
the agentive characteristics exhibited by these systems. 
Animality does not depend on an intentional stance but aims 
to articulate a set of mechanisms (Bechtel & Richardson, 
1993) that together give rise to behavioral-cognitive 
phenomena across the animal kingdom.  
Animality 
The notion of animality provides a relatively unencrusted 
term that allows one to focus on those aspects of animalia’s 
sensorimotor organization that tend to be obscured by an 
agentive terminology. In the following, I will try to clarify 
the notion of animality by discussing its derivation from the 
work of Hans Jonas, by providing an example that draws 
out the contrast with agency, and, finally, a first try at a 
more detailed analysis.  
“To Move and to Feel” 
Hans Jonas used the phrase animality in a book that aimed 
to link human existence to biology (1966).2 In one essay, 
“To move and to feel,” Jonas describes the switch from 
plant-life to animal-life. “Three characteristics distinguish 
animal from plant-life: motility, perception, emotion.” 
(p.99) Emotion comes in because motility induces a way of 
life that breaks the immediate and reliable organism-
environment relations of plant-life. To gain access to 
metabolically necessary nourishment, animal-life builds on 
a fickle, spatiotemporally drawn out process involving 
multiple steps. “The very span between start and attainment 
which such a series represents must be bridged by 
continuous emotional intent.” (p.101) Jonas used the phrase 
animality only in passing to refer to this characteristic setup 
for animal-life, but the notion targets precisely the motile 
and sensory setup which allows animalia to thrive. 
The obvious aspect of animal motility is that it enables the 
creature to move itself and to manipulate its environment. 
What I want to stress here is the specific organizational 
makeup behind motility that is very different from robot-
effectors (Keijzer, 1998; Sharkey & Ziemke, 2001). 
Particularly for multicellular creatures, the capacity to move 
is not a primitive, but in itself a significant achievement 
which requires the generation of patterns across the body—
for example undulations, locomotory waves or leg 
movements—and which is totally wrapped up with the 
specific characteristics of the body, e.g. whether the animal 
has a soft or hard skeleton, number of appendages and so 
on. To be motile for an animal requires a complex pattern 
generation process, which from an agentive perspective is 
easily left out of consideration. The role of the nervous 
system, if present, also becomes more easily cast in terms of 
pattern generation across the effector surfaces rather than 
executing relatively abstract tasks. 
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 Jonas’s work was brought to my attention by a review of Di 
Paolo (2005). 
Sensing in animalia is likewise a matter of being sensitive 
to patterns of change on sensory surfaces, whether these are 
chemical, tactile, electromagnetic or other. Again the 
particulars of the sensory surfaces are crucial to understand 
what is going on, and to understand how the animal 
operates. Questions that immediately arise in this 
perspective is how sensory and effector patterns relate to 
one another, and how the nervous system, if present, fits in. 
To wrap up, animality refers to the detailed structures and 
their role in the dynamical sensorimotor processes that are 
at work in animalia, and which are intrinsically related to 
metabolic functioning. I will now use the jellyfish Aglantha 
digitale to illustrate the contrast with agency. 
A Hydromedusan Example3 
The hydromedusan jellyfish Aglantha digitale consists of a 
transparent bell, which has an opening at the base. 
Movement of the creature is achieved by the patterned 
contraction of muscles set across the bell, making the bell 
itself contract, pushing water outside through the opening 
and so providing a kind of jet propulsion. From the margin 
at the base of the bell, many fine tentacles extend outwards. 
When small planktonic creatures touch these, they are killed 
by independently acting stinging cells (nematocysts) and 
carried to the margin by tentacle flexions (Mackie et al, 
2003). Subsequently the manubrium, say the mouth, bends 
toward the prey and engulfs it (ibid.). 
Taken as an agent, Aglantha does not amount to very 
much. Disregarding its feeding behavior and other 
intricacies, Aglantha does two things, swimming slowly to 
feed and, when touched, escaping by a fast swim. Dennett in 
his inventory of different kinds of mind would designate it 
as a Darwinian creature (1996, p.110), situated at the 
ground floor of his hierarchy as a creature hardwired by 
evolution about which nothing much needs to be said from a 
cognitive perspective. Similarly, Sterelny in The evolution 
of agency targets in this context “the evolution of belief-like 
states, and the evolutionary transition from organisms that 
detect and respond to their environment in very simple ways 
to more complex representation by an organism of its 
environment” (2001, p.21). Again, Aglantha, if taken as an 
agent, would be no more than a starting point that can be 
described as “very simple.” 
Animality provides a different view of the same creature. 
Foremost, it stresses that Aglantha is a living animal with a 
particular  metabolic and cellular organization. This is 
important because, when compared to the cellular level, 
Aglantha is a huge organization which involves different 
and complex new forms of coordination compared to those 
on the cellular level. The animality present in Aglantha is 
thus not its simple agentive functionality—deciding to swim 
either fast or slow—but, rather, the kind of problems that 
must be overcome to produce such large-scale functionality, 
given the initially microscopic cellular building blocks. As 
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 This section is based on information drawn from Brusca and 
Brusca (1990), Mackie, Marx and Meech (2003), Meech (1989), 
and Singla (1978). 
an analogy, one may consider the cognitive task of building 
an arch from three bricks as fairly trivial, but this changes 
radically when the bricks transform into huge megaliths 
weighing tons. The abstracted description of this task does 
not give sufficient guidance concerning its actual difficulty, 
as the latter is relative to the means available. An 
animalistic perspective on Aglantha then targets the 
processes that bring about behavioral functionality, instead 
of an agentive perspective which merely assumes that there 
is a set of processes that does the trick. The notion of 
animality draws attention to neural and sensorimotor means 
involved, and these are highly complex for all animalia. To 
press this point, given that biologists readily acknowledge 
the complexity of cellular signaling in biology, cognitive 
scientists should not hesitate to do the same when it comes 
to the cellular and neural signaling processes that occur in a 




Figure 1:  Aglantha digitale showing the bell and the 
tentacles attached to the margin. Right in the middle of the 
margin, the manubrium or mouth is visible.  
(Photograph  by  Claudia E. Mills). 
A Conceptual Elaboration 
The Aglantha example may seem to convey the message 
that animality amounts to a neuroethological view, targeting 
the details of the behavioral and neural mechanisms in 
comparatively simple animals. What does the notion of 
animality adds to this ongoing enterprise? First note that the 
concept of animality is brought forward to help answering 
the question what cognition is, and not as a different 
empirical approach to these behavioral and neural 
mechanisms. Animality should build on existing work as 
done within neuroethology and other relevant fields. Having 
said this, it might nevertheless be that the ongoing study of 
neural and behavioral mechanisms could benefit from work 
and concepts from embodied and situated cognition. This 
might be helpful to arrive at a more cohering global picture 
of the organizational principles involved in animality. In this 
section, I will discuss three concepts that could make a 
difference to ongoing empirical work. 
O’Regan and Noë (2001), relying on the classic work of 
Gibson and others, introduced the notion of  sensorimotor 
contingencies. O’Regan and Noë describe these as “the 
structure of the rules governing the sensory changes 
produced by various motor actions” (2001, p.941). For 
example, “when the eyes rotate, the sensory stimulation on 
the retina shifts and distorts in a very particular way, 
determined by the size of the eye movement, the spherical 
shape of the retina, and the nature of the ocular optics” 
(ibid.). The relations between motor output and sensory 
input obey specific lawful regularities and provide an 
important constraint and fundamental principle. The concept 
of sensorimotor contingencies can be used as a way to 
systematically investigate the relations between the specific 
motility and sensing capacities of particular animals and to 
search for and categorize regularities. As neural systems 
have evolved to coordinate such sensorimotor 
contingencies, they could provide an important handhold for 
their investigation. 
Another important concept can be termed layering, as e.g. 
exemplified in Brooks’ subsumption architecture for robots 
(Brooks, 1999) and Hurley’s (1998) notion of horizontal 
modularity. Layering implies that a control structure must 
first and foremost allow for ongoing sensorimotor relations. 
Everything else, including human thought, is derivative. 
Getting a minimal layer of sensorimotor coordination is the 
prime directive. From there on, improvements are possible 
by changing or adding to the sensors, effectors or neural 
systems of the existing system. The key issue with layering 
is that additional layers are additional and not separable 
from an underlying sensorimotor basis. This iterative 
buildup also gives a reason to think of animality as a 
coherent whole, where complex instances of animality form 
an organic organization, rather than an arbitrary collection 
of sensorimotor relations that can be freely taken apart. 
A third important concept, spatiotemporal pattern 
generation, has already been introduced as a key feature of 
generating motility. Both behavioral and neural pattern 
generation is important in neuroethological explanations. A 
wide variety of behaviors are generated by neural rhythmic 
pattern-generation circuits. “These include ongoing and 
stereotyped movements such as breathing, chewing, 
walking, running, flying, and swimming” (Marder & 
Calabrese, 1996, p.688). In addition, the sensory shaping of 
motor patterns is essential as well. “The dynamic interplay 
between central and sensory mechanisms in the generation 
of adaptive movements is seen in all preparations” (ibid.). 
Pattern generation provides a close conceptual link, going 
both ways, between neural and sensorimotor phenomena. 
As such, pattern generation and its role in animality could 
be a way to unravel neural functioning and its relation to 
sensorimotor phenomena at a more fundamental level and in 
greater detail than has so far been possible. 
In all three cases, it seems that the field of embodied and 
situated cognition, and neuroethology could be mutually 
enriching to a greater extent than has so far been the case, 
leading to a better understanding of animality. 
And Human Cognition? 
So far nothing has been said about human cognition. This 
was deliberate as the focus was on animality and the 
foundation of cognition. In this picture, human cognition is 
just one case among many, rather than the center of the 
cognitive domain. Of course, it is legitimate to be primarily 
interested in human cognition, and it goes without saying 
that human cognition is hugely different from what happens 
in Aglantha. However, as a general practice in science, for 
example human genetics, it is unusual to try to tackle the 
hardest case directly. From this perspective, it goes without 
saying that one must study more basic cognitive 
organizations to understand how they work. 
Thus, a final strong difference between agency and 
animality is that agency ultimately provides a human 
centered perspective—humans being the prime targets for 
ascribing rationality—while animality puts us in our animal 
context. We may be very different from even the great apes, 
but before we can truly understand those differences we 
should become more sensitive to the huge overlaps between 
human cognition and that of other animals. 
Founding Cognition in Animality? 
Summing up: Animality refers to the sensorimotor 
organization present in animalia, it does not build on agency 
but provides the kind of organization to which agency can 
be ‘properly’ ascribed. As yet, animality remains a 
preliminary notion that can and should be filled in by further 
research. The question to turn to now is: Can animality 
provide a suitable foundation for cognition? In the 
following, I will return to the two problems that agency 
encountered when cast in this role, starting out with the 
good news and then seeing whether there is any bad. 
First, animality provides a clear solution to the 
demarcation problem. Animalia are cognitive systems in 
some form or other, thermostats, robots and computers are 
not. The latter have a different kind of organization and for 
this reason cannot be deemed cognitive. This demarcation 
also seems sufficiently principled. Sensorimotor relations 
are plausibly the starting point of all animal cognition, 
while, at the upper level, they even generate ideas that might 
help explain how the brain gives rise to consciousness 
(Hurley & Noë, 2003). 
Second, animality also provides a solid way to deal with 
the graduality problem. The concepts of cognition and 
agency are notions that are specified irrespective of a 
particular physical organization, concerning which they are 
taken to apply, or not. Such a background makes a gradient 
from the physical to the cognitive problematical. Animality, 
in contrast, is a particular kind of physical setup, which 
during evolution arose first in a basic bacterial form, and 
from there on developed into many different forms, some of 
which are hugely more complex, like the human case. 
Graduality is part of the notion of animality from the very 
start. 
So far for the good news, what about the bad? Actually, I 
think there isn’t much, even though it may seem like that. 
One seeming problem might be that the animality criterion 
cuts of too many plausible cases of cognition, such as in AI 
or robots, another one could be the seeming lack of 
applicability to genuine human cognition and 
consciousness. As space is extremely limited, I will just hint 
at the kind of answers that can be given here. 
Are AI systems and robots wrongly left out? Let me just 
use an analogy: Could biology be criticized for leaving out 
of consideration Artificial Life models as clear cases of life? 
I think not. The differences are too huge. ALife models are 
life-like but, at present, not yet living themselves. I would 
argue that the same holds for the relation between AI and 
cognition (see also Sharkey and Ziemke, 2001). 
Is human cognition insufficiently dealt with? Again, no. 
The current project is to locate human cognition within the 
general natural science picture, not to provide an account of 
human cognition itself. It goes without saying that human 
cognition goes way beyond the simple cases that received 
attention here. However, to really understand the human 
case, it must be considered essential to understand the 
operation of nervous systems more generally as well as how 
this operation is linked up with sensorimotor processes, the 
raison d’être for any nervous system. It seems an 
irresponsible procedure not to pay close attention to simpler 
case studies, even when the ultimate goal is strictly human 
cognition. 
To conclude, I hold that animality provides a plausible 
articulation of the material kind of systems to which notions 
like cognition and agency most readily apply. From here on, 
we might start to consider what the implications are for 
these notions and for cognitive science. 
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